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docs: document shielded pools consensus rules from 7.1.2 Transaction Consensus Rules (#3486) 

* docs: document shielded pools consensus rules from 7.1.2 Transaction Consensus Rules

* Update zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs

Co-authored-by: Marek <mail@marek.onl>

Co-authored-by: Marek <mail@marek.onl>
Co-authored-by: mergify[bot] <37929162+mergify[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Conrado Gouvea 2022-02-12 22:18:08 -03:00 committed by GitHub
parent 20ac7b1cae
commit 3dce666828
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
1 changed files with 77 additions and 7 deletions
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zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs
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@ -731,9 +731,28 @@ where
));
}
// Consensus rule: The joinSplitSig MUST represent a
// valid signature, under joinSplitPubKey, of the
// sighash.
// # Consensus
//
// > If effectiveVersion ≥ 2 and nJoinSplit > 0, then:
// > - joinSplitPubKey MUST be a valid encoding of an Ed25519 validating key
// > - joinSplitSig MUST represent a valid signature under
// joinSplitPubKey of dataToBeSigned, as defined in § 4.11
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#txnconsensus
//
// The `if` part is indirectly enforced, since the `joinsplit_data`
// is only parsed if those conditions apply in
// [`Transaction::zcash_deserialize`].
//
// The valid encoding is defined in
//
// > A valid Ed25519 validating key is defined as a sequence of 32
// > bytes encoding a point on the Ed25519 curve
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#concreteed25519
//
// which is enforced during signature verification, in both batched
// and single verification, when decompressing the encoded point.
//
// Queue the validation of the JoinSplit signature while
// adding the resulting future to our collection of
@ -831,6 +850,36 @@ where
);
}
// # Consensus
//
// > The Spend transfers and Action transfers of a transaction MUST be
// > consistent with its vbalanceSapling value as specified in § 4.13
// > ‘Balance and Binding Signature (Sapling)’.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#spendsandoutputs
//
// > [Sapling onward] If effectiveVersion ≥ 4 and
// > nSpendsSapling + nOutputsSapling > 0, then:
// > – let bvk^{Sapling} and SigHash be as defined in § 4.13;
// > – bindingSigSapling MUST represent a valid signature under the
// > transaction binding validating key bvk Sapling of SigHash —
// > i.e. BindingSig^{Sapling}.Validate_{bvk^{Sapling}}(SigHash, bindingSigSapling ) = 1.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#txnconsensus
//
// This is validated by the verifier. The `if` part is indirectly
// enforced, since the `sapling_shielded_data` is only parsed if those
// conditions apply in [`Transaction::zcash_deserialize`].
//
// > [NU5 onward] As specified in § 5.4.7, the validation of the 𝑅 component
// > of the signature changes to prohibit non-canonical encodings.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#txnconsensus
//
// This is validated by the verifier, inside the `redjubjub` crate.
// It calls [`jubjub::AffinePoint::from_bytes`] to parse R and
// that enforces the canonical encoding.
let bvk = sapling_shielded_data.binding_verification_key();
async_checks.push(
@ -889,11 +938,32 @@ where
// # Consensus
//
// > The Spend transfers and Action transfers of a transaction MUST be
// > consistent with its vbalanceSapling value as specified in § 4.13
// > ‘Balance and Binding Signature (Sapling)’ on p. 49.
// > The Action transfers of a transaction MUST be consistent with
// > its v balanceOrchard value as specified in § 4.14.
//
// <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#spendsandoutputs>
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#actions
//
// > [NU5 onward] If effectiveVersion ≥ 5 and nActionsOrchard > 0, then:
// > – let bvk^{Orchard} and SigHash be as defined in § 4.14;
// > – bindingSigOrchard MUST represent a valid signature under the
// > transaction binding validating key bvk^{Orchard} of SigHash —
// > i.e. BindingSig^{Orchard}.Validate_{bvk^{Orchard}}(SigHash, bindingSigOrchard) = 1.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#txnconsensus
//
// This is validated by the verifier. The `if` part is indirectly
// enforced, since the `orchard_shielded_data` is only parsed if those
// conditions apply in [`Transaction::zcash_deserialize`].
//
// > As specified in § 5.4.7, validation of the 𝑅 component of the signature
// > prohibits non-canonical encodings.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#txnconsensus
//
// This is validated by the verifier, inside the `redpallas` crate.
// It calls [`pallas::Affine::from_bytes`] to parse R and
// that enforces the canonical encoding.
async_checks.push(
primitives::redpallas::VERIFIER
.clone()