Refactor validation of Sapling shielded data in `transaction::Verifier` (#2419)

* Refactor to create `verify_sapling_shielded_data`

Move the code to verify Sapling shielded data into a new helper method
that returns `AsyncChecks`.

* Test verifying a Sapling transaction with spends

Use the test vectors to find a transaction that has Sapling spends and
test if it the verifier considers it valid.

* Create a helper method to list test transactions

Transforms the block test vectors into a list of transactions and block
heights for each transaction.

* Use new helper function in V4 Sapling spend test

Also use the block height for that transaction as specified in the test
vector.

* Test V4 tx. with Sapling outputs but no spends

Find a transaction V4 vector that has Sapling outputs but no spends, and
check that the verifier accepts it.
This commit is contained in:
Janito Vaqueiro Ferreira Filho 2021-06-30 23:17:37 -03:00 committed by GitHub
parent f33923f12f
commit 76fca5f32f
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
4 changed files with 213 additions and 100 deletions

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ edition = "2018"
[features]
default = []
proptest-impl = ["proptest", "proptest-derive", "itertools"]
proptest-impl = ["proptest", "proptest-derive", "itertools", "zebra-test"]
bench = ["zebra-test"]
[dependencies]

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@ -567,6 +567,27 @@ fn sapling_spend_v4_to_fake_v5(
}
}
/// Iterate over V4 transactions in the block test vectors for the specified `network`.
pub fn test_transactions(
network: Network,
) -> impl DoubleEndedIterator<Item = (block::Height, Arc<Transaction>)> {
let blocks = match network {
Network::Mainnet => zebra_test::vectors::MAINNET_BLOCKS.iter(),
Network::Testnet => zebra_test::vectors::TESTNET_BLOCKS.iter(),
};
blocks.flat_map(|(&block_height, &block_bytes)| {
let block = block_bytes
.zcash_deserialize_into::<block::Block>()
.expect("block is structurally valid");
block
.transactions
.into_iter()
.map(move |transaction| (block::Height(block_height), transaction))
})
}
/// Generate an iterator over fake V5 transactions.
///
/// These transactions are converted from non-V5 transactions that exist in the provided network

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@ -252,11 +252,6 @@ where
joinsplit_data: &Option<transaction::JoinSplitData<Groth16Proof>>,
sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<sapling::PerSpendAnchor>>,
) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
let mut spend_verifier = primitives::groth16::SPEND_VERIFIER.clone();
let mut output_verifier = primitives::groth16::OUTPUT_VERIFIER.clone();
let mut redjubjub_verifier = primitives::redjubjub::VERIFIER.clone();
// A set of asynchronous checks which must all succeed.
// We finish by waiting on these below.
let mut async_checks = AsyncChecks::new();
@ -279,99 +274,9 @@ where
&shielded_sighash,
));
if let Some(sapling_shielded_data) = sapling_shielded_data {
for spend in sapling_shielded_data.spends_per_anchor() {
// Consensus rule: cv and rk MUST NOT be of small
// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]rk
// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#spenddesc
check::spend_cv_rk_not_small_order(&spend)?;
// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKSpend MUST be valid
// given a primary input formed from the other
// fields except spendAuthSig.
//
// Queue the verification of the Groth16 spend proof
// for each Spend description while adding the
// resulting future to our collection of async
// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
// transaction to verify.
let spend_rsp = spend_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(&spend).into());
async_checks.push(spend_rsp.boxed());
// Consensus rule: The spend authorization signature
// MUST be a valid SpendAuthSig signature over
// SigHash using rk as the validating key.
//
// Queue the validation of the RedJubjub spend
// authorization signature for each Spend
// description while adding the resulting future to
// our collection of async checks that (at a
// minimum) must pass for the transaction to verify.
let rsp = redjubjub_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call((spend.rk, spend.spend_auth_sig, &shielded_sighash).into());
async_checks.push(rsp.boxed());
}
for output in sapling_shielded_data.outputs() {
// Consensus rule: cv and wpk MUST NOT be of small
// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]wpk
// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#outputdesc
check::output_cv_epk_not_small_order(output)?;
// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKOutput MUST be
// valid given a primary input formed from the other
// fields except C^enc and C^out.
//
// Queue the verification of the Groth16 output
// proof for each Output description while adding
// the resulting future to our collection of async
// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
// transaction to verify.
let output_rsp = output_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(output).into());
async_checks.push(output_rsp.boxed());
}
let bvk = sapling_shielded_data.binding_verification_key();
// TODO: enable async verification and remove this block - #1939
{
let item: zebra_chain::primitives::redjubjub::batch::Item =
(bvk, sapling_shielded_data.binding_sig, &shielded_sighash).into();
item.verify_single().unwrap_or_else(|binding_sig_error| {
let binding_sig_error = binding_sig_error.to_string();
tracing::warn!(%binding_sig_error, "ignoring");
metrics::counter!("zebra.error.sapling.binding",
1,
"kind" => binding_sig_error);
});
// Ignore errors until binding signatures are fixed
//.map_err(|e| BoxError::from(Box::new(e)))?;
}
let _rsp = redjubjub_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call((bvk, sapling_shielded_data.binding_sig, &shielded_sighash).into())
.boxed();
// TODO: stop ignoring binding signature errors - #1939
// async_checks.push(rsp);
}
async_checks.extend(
Self::verify_sapling_shielded_data(sapling_shielded_data, &shielded_sighash).await?,
);
Ok(async_checks)
}
@ -518,6 +423,114 @@ where
checks
}
/// Verifies a transaction's Sapling shielded data.
async fn verify_sapling_shielded_data(
sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<sapling::PerSpendAnchor>>,
shielded_sighash: &blake2b_simd::Hash,
) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
let async_checks = AsyncChecks::new();
if let Some(sapling_shielded_data) = sapling_shielded_data {
let mut spend_verifier = primitives::groth16::SPEND_VERIFIER.clone();
let mut output_verifier = primitives::groth16::OUTPUT_VERIFIER.clone();
let mut redjubjub_verifier = primitives::redjubjub::VERIFIER.clone();
for spend in sapling_shielded_data.spends_per_anchor() {
// Consensus rule: cv and rk MUST NOT be of small
// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]rk
// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#spenddesc
check::spend_cv_rk_not_small_order(&spend)?;
// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKSpend MUST be valid
// given a primary input formed from the other
// fields except spendAuthSig.
//
// Queue the verification of the Groth16 spend proof
// for each Spend description while adding the
// resulting future to our collection of async
// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
// transaction to verify.
let spend_rsp = spend_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(&spend).into());
async_checks.push(spend_rsp.boxed());
// Consensus rule: The spend authorization signature
// MUST be a valid SpendAuthSig signature over
// SigHash using rk as the validating key.
//
// Queue the validation of the RedJubjub spend
// authorization signature for each Spend
// description while adding the resulting future to
// our collection of async checks that (at a
// minimum) must pass for the transaction to verify.
let rsp = redjubjub_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call((spend.rk, spend.spend_auth_sig, &shielded_sighash).into());
async_checks.push(rsp.boxed());
}
for output in sapling_shielded_data.outputs() {
// Consensus rule: cv and wpk MUST NOT be of small
// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]wpk
// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#outputdesc
check::output_cv_epk_not_small_order(output)?;
// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKOutput MUST be
// valid given a primary input formed from the other
// fields except C^enc and C^out.
//
// Queue the verification of the Groth16 output
// proof for each Output description while adding
// the resulting future to our collection of async
// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
// transaction to verify.
let output_rsp = output_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(output).into());
async_checks.push(output_rsp.boxed());
}
let bvk = sapling_shielded_data.binding_verification_key();
// TODO: enable async verification and remove this block - #1939
{
let item: zebra_chain::primitives::redjubjub::batch::Item =
(bvk, sapling_shielded_data.binding_sig, &shielded_sighash).into();
item.verify_single().unwrap_or_else(|binding_sig_error| {
let binding_sig_error = binding_sig_error.to_string();
tracing::warn!(%binding_sig_error, "ignoring");
metrics::counter!("zebra.error.sapling.binding",
1,
"kind" => binding_sig_error);
});
// Ignore errors until binding signatures are fixed
//.map_err(|e| BoxError::from(Box::new(e)))?;
}
let _rsp = redjubjub_verifier
.ready_and()
.await?
.call((bvk, sapling_shielded_data.binding_sig, &shielded_sighash).into())
.boxed();
// TODO: stop ignoring binding signature errors - #1939
// async_checks.push(rsp);
}
Ok(async_checks)
}
/// Await a set of checks that should all succeed.
///
/// If any of the checks fail, this method immediately returns the error and cancels all other

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@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ use zebra_chain::{
serialization::ZcashDeserialize,
sprout,
transaction::{
arbitrary::{fake_v5_transactions_for_network, insert_fake_orchard_shielded_data},
arbitrary::{
fake_v5_transactions_for_network, insert_fake_orchard_shielded_data, test_transactions,
},
Hash, HashType, JoinSplitData, LockTime, Transaction,
},
transparent::{self, CoinbaseData},
@ -696,6 +698,83 @@ fn v4_with_unsigned_sprout_transfer_is_rejected() {
});
}
/// Test if a V4 transaction with Sapling spends is accepted by the verifier.
#[test]
fn v4_with_sapling_spends() {
zebra_test::init();
zebra_test::RUNTIME.block_on(async {
let network = Network::Mainnet;
let (height, transaction) = test_transactions(network)
.rev()
.filter(|(_, transaction)| {
!transaction.is_coinbase() && transaction.inputs().is_empty()
})
.find(|(_, transaction)| transaction.sapling_spends_per_anchor().next().is_some())
.expect("No transaction found with Sapling spends");
let expected_hash = transaction.hash();
// Initialize the verifier
let state_service =
service_fn(|_| async { unreachable!("State service should not be called") });
let script_verifier = script::Verifier::new(state_service);
let verifier = Verifier::new(network, script_verifier);
// Test the transaction verifier
let result = verifier
.clone()
.oneshot(Request::Block {
transaction,
known_utxos: Arc::new(HashMap::new()),
height,
})
.await;
assert_eq!(result, Ok(expected_hash));
});
}
/// Test if a V4 transaction with Sapling outputs but no spends is accepted by the verifier.
#[test]
fn v4_with_sapling_outputs_and_no_spends() {
zebra_test::init();
zebra_test::RUNTIME.block_on(async {
let network = Network::Mainnet;
let (height, transaction) = test_transactions(network)
.rev()
.filter(|(_, transaction)| {
!transaction.is_coinbase() && transaction.inputs().is_empty()
})
.find(|(_, transaction)| {
transaction.sapling_spends_per_anchor().next().is_none()
&& transaction.sapling_outputs().next().is_some()
})
.expect("No transaction found with Sapling spends");
let expected_hash = transaction.hash();
// Initialize the verifier
let state_service =
service_fn(|_| async { unreachable!("State service should not be called") });
let script_verifier = script::Verifier::new(state_service);
let verifier = Verifier::new(network, script_verifier);
// Test the transaction verifier
let result = verifier
.clone()
.oneshot(Request::Block {
transaction,
known_utxos: Arc::new(HashMap::new()),
height,
})
.await;
assert_eq!(result, Ok(expected_hash));
});
}
// Utility functions
/// Create a mock transparent transfer to be included in a transaction.