* start refactoring transaction v4 for transaction v5
- move ShieldedData to sapling
- add AnchorVariant
- rename shielded_data to sapling_shielded data in V4
- move value_balance into ShieldedData
- update prop tests for new structure
* add AnchorVariant to Spend
- make anchor types available from sapling crate
- update serialize
* change shielded_balances_match() arguments
* change variable name anchor to shared_anchor in ShieldedData
* fix empty value balance serialization
* use AnchorV in shielded spends
* Rename anchor to per_spend_anchor
* Use nullifiers function directly in non-finalized state
* Use self.value_balance instead of passing it as an argument
* Add missing fields to ShieldedData PartialEq
* Derive Copy for tag types
* Add doc comments for ShieldedData refactor
* Implement a per-spend anchor compatibility iterator
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
* Ed25519 async batch verification for JoinSplit signatures
We've been verifying JoinSplitSigs one-by-one pre-ZIP-215. Now as we're post-ZIP-215,
we can take advantage of the batch math to validate this signatures.
I would have pumped all the joinsplits in our MAINNET_BLOCKS test vectors but these
signatures are over the sighash, which needs the NU code to compute, and once we're
doing all that set up, we're basically doing transaction validation, so.
Resolves#1944
* Repoint to latest ed25519-zebra commit with note to point at 3.0 when released
Co-authored-by: Alfredo Garcia <oxarbitrage@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
* create block subsidy rfc
* add reference in miner subsidy
* remove `or 0` from function descriptions.
It is clear from the signature that the function will return `Error` on any failure(including input errors, for example a wrong height). Describing this will force us to write it for all functions that returns an error so better remove it.
* add links to subsidy categories
* fix design in Funding streams parameter constants
* fix order in FUNDING_STREAM_RECEIVER_NUMERATORS
* return `PayToScriptHash` in `funding_stream_address`
* add shielded coinbase
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
Co-authored-by: Daira Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>
* improve transparent value pool section
* add a test plan section
* rename `subsidy_is_correct` to `subsidy_is_valid`
* add funding streams address constants
* fix funding stream addresses
* add errors
* remove ending dot for error descriptions
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
* modify founders reward
* change ECC to BP
* add note about state needed for transparent pool
* split constants
* Tweak block subsidy RFC wording
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
* Clarify transaction fees definition
* Use consistent fee terminology
* Clarify transparent value pool
* Revise implementation plan based on latest priorities
* Change tests based on new priorities
* Fix markdown
Co-authored-by: Alfredo Garcia <oxarbitrage@gmail.com>
* Fix value pool description
* change block and miner subsidy definitions
* fee pool definitions, fix all links to protocol
* add reference to zip209
* add note for MG stream number of addresses
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
Co-authored-by: Daira Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
* rfc: initial draft of release process proposal
This is a version of the notes I posted in slack for preliminary
discussion, slightly reformatted to fit the Zebra RFC template.
@yaahc suggested I post them as an RFC, to have a concrete proposal for
discussion.
* Add draft note and link to ticket and PR
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
When we're naming the anchors without the corresponding type or struct,
it's not clear if they are shared or per spend.
Rename the fields as `shared_anchor` or `per_spend_anchor`.
`sanitize` could be misused in two ways:
* accidentally modifying the addresses in the address book itself
* forgetting to sanitize new fields added to `MetaAddr`
This change prevents accidental modification by taking `&self`, and
explicitly creates a new sanitized `MetaAddr` with all fields listed.
* Create CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
Starting with the zcashd CoC and the Rust CoC
* Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
* Update contact email
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
* Remove redundant contact line
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
* cleanup code of conduct
* move the email link to be consistent with rustlangs
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Deirdre Connolly <deirdre@zfnd.org>
* Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
remove forums from the list of official Zcash Foundation venues as the forums already have their own CoC
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jane@zfnd.org>
Co-authored-by: Pili Guerra <mpguerra@users.noreply.github.com>
* propose a v5 transaction rfc
* define orchard flags
* Update test sections
* Add security section
* move some code into sapling and orchard crates, do renames
* Move sapling value balance into shielded data
* Add AuthorizedAction type
* Order fields based on last serialized data
* Add the proofsOrchard field
* Delete visibility modifiers for readability
All those `pub`s make the design harder to read.
* Model anchor variants as generic trait types
* Be specific about the network upgrade
* Specify a file for each new type
* Document how the Orchard flags are used
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
Zebra's latest alpha checkpoints on Canopy activation, continues our work on NU5, and fixes a security issue.
Some notable changes include:
## Added
- Log address book metrics when PeerSet or CandidateSet don't have many peers (#1906)
- Document test coverage workflow (#1919)
- Add a final job to CI, so we can easily require all the CI jobs to pass (#1927)
## Changed
- Zebra has moved its mandatory checkpoint from Sapling to Canopy (#1898, #1926)
- This is a breaking change for users that depend on the exact height of the mandatory checkpoint.
## Fixed
- tower-batch: wake waiting workers on close to avoid hangs (#1908)
- Assert that pre-Canopy blocks use checkpointing (#1909)
- Fix CI disk space usage by disabling incremental compilation in coverage builds (#1923)
## Security
- Stop relying on unchecked length fields when preallocating vectors (#1925)
Zebra already uses `Read::take` to enforce message, body, and block
maximum sizes.
So using `Read::take` on untrusted sizes can result in short reads,
without a corresponding `UnexpectedEof` error. (The old code was
correct, but copying it elsewhere would have been risky.)
Deirdre Connolly
teor
Alfredo Garcia
Henry de Valence
dependabot[bot]
Deirdre Connolly