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Resolve a few doc warnings about unquoted HTML tags (#5477)

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teor 2022-10-25 22:14:21 +10:00 committed by GitHub
parent 233220ace0
commit d1bcc3292e
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2 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions
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2
zebra-chain/src/orchard/shielded_data.rs
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@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ impl AuthorizedAction {
/// [ps]: <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/nu5.pdf#actionencodingandconsensus>
pub const ACTION_SIZE: u64 = 5 * 32 + 580 + 80;
/// The size of a single Signature<SpendAuth>
/// The size of a single `Signature<SpendAuth>`.
///
/// Each Signature is 64 bytes.
/// [7.1 Transaction Encoding and Consensus][ps]

12
zebra-chain/src/serialization/zcash_deserialize.rs
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@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ impl<T: ZcashDeserialize + TrustedPreallocate> ZcashDeserialize for AtLeastOne<T
}
}
/// Implement ZcashDeserialize for Vec<u8> directly instead of using the blanket Vec implementation
/// Implement ZcashDeserialize for `Vec<u8>` directly instead of using the blanket Vec implementation
///
/// This allows us to optimize the inner loop into a single call to `read_exact()`
/// Note that we don't implement TrustedPreallocate for u8.
@ -158,14 +158,14 @@ impl<R: io::Read> ZcashDeserializeInto for R {
}
}
/// Blind preallocation of a Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate> is based on a bounded length. This is in contrast
/// to blind preallocation of a generic Vec<T>, which is a DOS vector.
/// Blind preallocation of a `Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>` is based on a bounded length. This is in contrast
/// to blind preallocation of a generic `Vec<T>`, which is a DOS vector.
///
/// The max_allocation() function provides a loose upper bound on the size of the Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>
/// The max_allocation() function provides a loose upper bound on the size of the `Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>`
/// which can possibly be received from an honest peer. If this limit is too low, Zebra may reject valid messages.
/// In the worst case, setting the lower bound too low could cause Zebra to fall out of consensus by rejecting all messages containing a valid block.
pub trait TrustedPreallocate {
/// Provides a ***loose upper bound*** on the size of the Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>
/// Provides a ***loose upper bound*** on the size of the `Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>`
/// which can possibly be received from an honest peer.
fn max_allocation() -> u64;
}
@ -182,6 +182,6 @@ where
/// The length of the longest valid `Vec<u8>` that can be received over the network
///
/// It takes 5 bytes to encode a CompactSize representing any number netween 2^16 and (2^32 - 1)
/// MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN is ~2^21, so the largest Vec<u8> that can be received from an honest peer is
/// MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN is ~2^21, so the largest `Vec<u8>` that can be received from an honest peer is
/// (MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 5);
pub(crate) const MAX_U8_ALLOCATION: usize = MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 5;